The independent commentary on British political affairs.
The independent commentary on British political affairs.
May 2008
Vol. 11, No. 11
A People's War: Brenda Boardman | The shadow over Brown's plan's to change the way we are governed: … More…
Available for subscribers to download now, in the Print Magazine section.
This article is provided free-to-view for all visitors to thepolitician.org.
The content of the Reform Treaty signed last month in Lisbon is not particularly exciting. Nevertheless, it must be ratified because it allows the EU27 to continue developing, hopefully with a more ambitious reform agenda for its policies (not its institutions) in the near future.
Critically, in contrast with the Constitutional Treaty, the Reform Treaty will not lead to there being a single EU Treaty document. Instead, it amends the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.
Remaining with several Treaties is not an improvement and will not facilitate readability and comprehension by EU citizens, as the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 had expected. Poor readability also detracts from several provisions of the Reform Treaty: for instance, the transitory measures on the implementation of the double majority system in the council of ministers are quite impossible to understand.
We can also regret that the terms ‘law’ and ‘framework law’, which were included in the Constitutional Treaty, have disappeared in the Reform Treaty; they made more sense for citizen than the terms ‘rulings’ and ‘directives’ which they were to have replaced. Even ‘European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ meant much more than ‘High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP).
Academics and politicians will probably continue comparing the Constitutional Treaty with the Reform Treaty for some time. Are they similar or different texts?
No doubt that the institutional provisions are quite the same: double majority voting in the Council, reform in the composition of the European Parliament, permanent Presidency for the European Council, and so forth.
Most of these reforms are political answers to the fears of the citizens of the ‘old’ member states like France, Germany or the Netherlands that the enlargement from 15 to 27 will put the EU decision-making process in a situation of gridlock. In fact, there has been no demonstration that the 2004 enlargement has decreased the capacity of the EU to act. Studies made by leading scholars like Renaud Dehousse*, Edward Best and Pierpaolo Settembri show quite the opposite. The decision-making speed of the EU Council of ministers has actually been a bit quicker since the 2004 enlargement.
The most difficult question for the EU since Maastricht has been: how to increase its legitimacy, both inside and outside? For this reason, the creation of a permanent President of the European Council is a good idea: it will increase the representation of the EU vis-a-vis its citizens and vis–a-vis third countries. However, the success of this new post will depend very much on the personal qualities of its holder. The new competences devoted to the High Representative for CFSP are far less convincing.
How can this High Representative be at the same time the Vice-President of the Commission in charge of external affairs and the President of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs? Getting instructions from both the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission will put the High Representative in an uncomfortable position.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not included as such in the Treaty but there is a reference to the Charter as proclaimed by the institutions of the EU. A bill of rights protecting the citizens’ rights is important to develop common feeling inside the EU. The UK and Poland got exemptions stating that their nationals will continue to be subject to British or Polish courts for the interpretation of the Charter.
In the case of the UK, the exemption has been presented as a request from industry following fears that the social rights included in the Charter could inhibit the flexibility of the labour market. There would have been little chance of that, but it serves to show the Labour government’s business friendliness and its clear will to reassure its centre wing electorate (urban middle class) that by no means it will go back to the pre-Thatcher period where powerful worker unions blocked economic reforms.
Apart from the institutional provisions, the Reform Treaty does not propose huge reforms of the Community’s policies. We could have expected much more on the environment or energy, rather than the new legal bases for tackling climate change and energy solidarity which are there only to allow implementation of the relevant conclusions of the Council of Ministers.
Without doubt, the most innovative section of the Reform Treaty is Part IV on the Functioning of the Union with regard to justice, freedom and security. This is a logical progression from the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and continues the gradual ‘communitarisation’ in the area of judicial co-operation. Once again, the UK has opted out. Other EU member states should accept this British decision, the relevance of which requires discussion in London rather than in Brussels. But not participating in these policies (as not adopting the Euro) has one obvious consequence for the UK: it prevents London from exercising any real leadership inside the EU. But do a majority of the British politicians really worry about not exercising a leadership in Europe?
To conclude, the Reform Treaty demonstrates a clear insistence from the member states that their respective national competences are to be protected. This is absolutely in tune with a current public opinion, both in the ‘old’ and in the ‘new’ member states.
The ‘obstinate nation state’ as the Franco-American political scientist Stanley Hoffmann called it after the Empty Chair Crisis in 1966, has won. But it is not certain that this ‘victory’ will be the best way to cope with the challenges of a global world in which all members of the EU (including Germany, France and the UK) look rather small.
Professor Christian Lequesne, Sciences Po – LSE Alliance Chair, European Institute, LSE.
*See Renaud Dehousse’s article ‘A quick fix for Europe, then the long haul for France’ on Parliamentary Brief’s website www.thepolitician.org
The entente fraternelle that London dares not enterArticles above share some of the the following topic(s) with this article: Justice, EU, Europe, Nation State, Reform Treaty, Treaty of Lisbon.